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Abstract:
In this paper, we analyze how to utilize discount rates in intergenerational projects. Firstly,
neoclassical decision-making is depicted in Ramsey and overlapping-generations models
(OLG-models). Afterwards we investigate the utilization of time preference rates and oppor-
tunity cost rates in an intergenerational framework. The results lead us to the formulation of an
adjusted OLG-discounting method of consumption units, taking into consideration intra- and
intergenerational aspects. At the end of our paper, we draw some conclusions concerning
environmental and resources policy, and sustainability.
1. Introduction
In cost-benefit analyses for evaluating public projects and political programs, all effects have to
be related to the time of planning. This is done by discounting. We consider long-term projects
which not only concern today’s generations, but also affect people living in the remote future.
Among these projects are investments in public infrastructure (road construction, provision of
drinking water, town and regional planning, provision of natural reserves, etc.), decisions
about the usage of exhaustible resources (deposits of oil, natural gas, coal, and minerals) and
renewable resources (stocks of animals and plants, soil and groundwater resources), as well as
decisions about the pollution of the environment with long-term pollutants (global warming,
depletion of the ozone layer, etc.). As a result of discounting, future effects are valued less
highly in today's calculations than current effects. This could, in the end, lead to arbitrary
distortions in certain cost-benefit analyses. Even small variations of the discount rate can lead
to different assessments of the profitability (see figure 1). Therefore, the discount rate has to be
chosen with care and in accordance with the principles of cost-benefit analysis.
In our paper, we want to demonstrate which considerations influence the determination of dis-
count rates in long-term projects, keeping in mind that different generations are affected. This
is in particular the case with environmental projects, therefore, we mainly use such projects as
examples. Nevertheless, our proposals can be utilized to evaluate other undertakings where
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long-term effects are feasible for different generations, such as infrastructure projects, and
(exhaustible and renewable) resource uses
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Figure 1: Present values of two projects, dependent on the discount rate. The investigated six-period
projects with equal costs in the planning period are given by the following cost-benefit streams (in US-
$): Project A: -3,000; -300; -100; 0; 500; 5,000. Project B: -3,000; 900; 900; 900; 900; 900. Using a
discount rate of 5.6368 %, both projects have the same present value. Using a lower one, project A is
the efficient one, whereas a discount rate larger than 5.6368 % characterizes project B as efficient.
2. The neoclassical approach
The theoretical basis for cost-benefit analyses is found in neoclassical economics. Public proj-
ects are designed to increase economic welfare and, therefore, they must pass a cost-benefit
comparison. Welfare is considered to increase when the project-induced present value of all
benefits exceeds the present value of all costs. In the calculation of the present values, two
discount rates can principally be used: the (marginal) social rate of time preference and the
(marginal) social rate of opportunity costs. These rates are derived from the assumed behavior
of consumers and producers. The households prefer present to future consumption. They want
to maximize the present value of life-time consumption. They orient their consumption-saving
decision on the exogenous market interest rate. If the interest rate exceeds their individual
marginal time preference rate, they will reduce present in favor of future consumption. If the
market interest rate is below the individual marginal time preference rate, they will expand
present consumption at the cost of diminishing future consumption. The adjustments lead to an
equilibrium where the market interest rate equals the individual marginal time preference rate.
The enterprises strive to maximize the present value of the return on investments. The invest-
ment decision is oriented on the exogenous market interest rate. If the marginal productivity of
capital exceeds the interest rate, increases in capital investment are profitable. If, on the other
hand, the interest rate exceeds marginal productivity, investments will be reduced. The
triggered adjustment processes lead to the equivalence of marginal productivity and market
interest rate. At the same time, an overall economic equilibrium (equivalence of saving and
investment) prevails. Because the intertemporal decisions of households and enterprises are
brought together by the interest rate which can be used as discount rates instead of the single
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rates. The following relationship holds: market rate of interest (i) = marginal rate of time
preference = marginal productivity of capital.
The simple two-period model is extended to the long term in optimal growth theory (see Ram-
sey (1928) and among others Bayer/Cansier (1998), Lind (1995)). In these so-called Ramsey
models, a representative individual with an infinite lifespan is assumed. People live as long as
the time of utilization of the project extends. The maximization calculus of the representative
individual is given by:
(1) ( )max U C e dtt t
t
⋅∫ −
=
∞
ρ
0
     s.t. &K Y Ct t t= − .
U(Ct) represents the utility from consumption bundle Ct in period t. The premise of diminishing
marginal utility from consumption holds for the utility function: dU/dCt>0; d2U/dCt2<0. ρ sym-
bolizes the pure rate of time preference (utility discount rate), Yt denotes the national product
in period t and &Kt  stands for investment. We concentrate our analysis on the consumer side.
Nevertheless, assumptions about the production function have to be taken into account as well.
The most important one is that there is diminishing marginal productivity of production with
increasing inputs, especially capital: ∂Y/∂K>0 and ∂2Y/∂K2<0. With dynamic optimization, the
Ramsey rule is provided as first-order optimality condition:
(2) i Y
K
g= = = +∂
∂
δ ρ ε .
The discount rate, which equals the market interest rate i, also corresponds to the marginal
productivity of capital ∂Y/∂K (opportunity cost rate) and, respectively, to the aggregated
overall economic time preference rate δ, which is composed of the pure time preference rate ρ
and the growth time preference rate ε⋅g. ε stands for the elasticity of marginal utility of con-
sumption (percentage change of marginal utility when consumption is increased by one per-
cent), and g stands for the growth rate of real consumption. The product describes the change
in the marginal utility of consumption. During growth, the supply with consumption goods in
the future is larger than in the present. Additional consumption goods are, therefore, valued
less than in the present due to the higher future individual level of welfare. The situation is the
other way round in an economy with decreasing per-capita income (consumption).
A problematic area in the neoclassical model for our analysis is the assumption that the repre-
sentative individual lives infinitely. For climate protection, for instance, this means that the
people living today will bear the necessary costs as well as benefits from the prevention of the
greenhouse effect in a hundred, two hundred or more years. This is a considerable simplifica-
tion. It ignores the fact that the costs and benefits affect different generations. In long-term
projects, one always has to consider distributional aspects in addition to the allocative ones.
In dynastic models and in models with overlapping generations (OLG-models), the neo-
classic approach tries to gain better control of the time problem. In dynastic models, an ex-
pansion of the individual time horizon to the long term is constructed by the interconnection of
the interests of parents, children and grandchildren or of generations with empathic closeness
(see e.g. Blanchard/Fischer (1989), Barro/Sala-i-Martin (1995), Barro (1997)). But the
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cardinal problem remains yet unresolved: no comparisons are made between different genera-
tions. Furthermore, these modifications are hardly, or rather never, used in environmental or
resource-economic models (see e.g. Nordhaus (1994)). Despite the consideration of de-
scendants, in both expansions it is always assumed that their preferences do not differ signifi-
cantly from their ancestors’ ones. In particular, the ancestors’ decision for or against a climate-
protection measure would be made by the descendants in the same way. This implicitly states
that the ancestors take all decisions considering the (potential) existence of their descendants
into consideration. Nevertheless their interests only enter the analysis in a considerably reduced
scale, and the less weight is given to these considerations the more distant the kinship is.
Overlapping-Generation Models (OLG-Models) take into consideration that people of dif-
ferent age groups are living at the same time (see e.g. Blanchard/Fischer (1989)). We want to
solely concentrate on the demand side and to maintain the premise of diminishing marginal
utility. The production side will be neglected for simplification. But we want to keep in mind
that OLG-Models usually analyze general economic equilibria. In the simplest case, only two
generations exist, an old and a young one. In its two-year life, each generation maximizes the
present value of life-time consumption at the beginning of their respective lives. At the start of
a new period, the respective oldest generation dies and a new generation is born. The (up to
now) young generation becomes the old one at the same time, and the total number of living
generations remains unchanged. The intertemporal budget restriction of the respective gen-
eration designates that the young generation earns income from work which can be consumed
or saved. The saved amount of income from work plus the accrued interest forms the income
of the older individuals. The maximization problem is as follows:
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+
    s.t.  U C U C C C i Yt
t
t
t
t
t
+ +


 + + =
1 1
1 1ρ
The variable it symbolizes the exogenously given market interest rate on which every individual
in each generation orients its consumption-saving decision. The following necessary condition
results:
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The efficiency criterion implies that every individual extends its saving activities until the mar-
ginal rate of substitution between consumption today and consumption tomorrow equals the
quotient of one plus the market interest rate and one plus the utility discount rate (pure time
preference rate). From these considerations, two conclusions inevitably follow: (a) in this
model one only saves income if the exogenous (marginal) market interest rate exceeds the
individual (marginal) time preference rate, and, if (a) holds, (b) there exists a positive growth
discount rate (ε⋅g:=it-ρ>0). Otherwise the opportunity costs of saving exceed the rate of re-
turn. In this situation, saving would be economically inefficient because immediate con-
sumption increases individual as well as overall economic welfare more than future consump-
tion (today's savings) does.
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In OLG-models, infinite discounting using the pure rate of time preference is prevented. This
automatically leads to higher present values of utility during the planning period. The economy
always proceeds on its optimal path. All economic variables retain their optimal state in their
development paths, which characterizes an all-time equilibrium during positive growth. The
calculation of present values of any future consumption effect can be done as shown in Table
1. Generation E, for example, living in the periods t3 and t4, values project-induced (marginal)
consumption effects ct3 and ct4 in accordance with their individual calculation of utility maximi-
zation. Changes in the overall economic welfare up to period t3 are taken into account by
considering that the generation’s welfare increased and, therefore, the level of marginal utility
is lower.
Generation t0 t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 L
A U(ct0)
B U(ct0) U(ct1)⋅θ-1
C U(ct1) U(ct2)⋅θ-1
D U(ct2) U(ct3)⋅θ-1
E U(ct3) U(ct4)⋅θ-1
F U(ct4) U(ct5)⋅θ-1
G U(ct5) L
M M O
Table 1: Utility effects of a consumption-augmenting investment in period t0; θ≡(1+ρ).
The dark shaded areas in Table 1 illustrate those time periods in the planning horizon which are
of no importance in intergenerational discounting. In contradiction to Ramsey models, no indi-
vidual lives infinitely. However, OLG-models investigate the optimal paths of all relevant
macro-variables. All of them are equilibral. No incentives are given to reallocate the individual
resources in order to improve individual welfare. Furthermore, public projects affect the total
lifetime consumption planning of all individuals. They are taken into account in each individ-
ual's utility-maximizing considerations because of perfect foresight. Public projects will only be
carried out if the utility-oriented present value passes the cost-benefit criterion. However, per-
fect foresight and general overall equilibrium are excessively strong assumptions in intergen-
erational comparisons. Global warming, for instance, has not been recognized as a long-term
problem for a rather long time. Therefore, until now market failure has prevailed which forces
the previously known optimality paths to be modified. Current replanning would not confirm
the originally computed optimality paths of all variables.
In summary, neoclassical Ramsey models are not applicable for the valuation of intergenera-
tional effects due to the outlined reasons. In OLG-models, the restrictive and unrealistic as-
sumption of the infinitely-lived individual is given up (as well as the helpful construction of the
bequeathing motive or the dynastic models), but the framework of common equilibrium theory
in the intergenerational context is not abandoned, which is hardly realistic in the case of public
projects with an (extremely) long planning period.
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3. Intergenerational Equity and Individual Time Preference Rates
Before discussing different types of discount rates and their legitimization in intergenerational
cost-benefit analysis, we want to make some simplifying assumptions for convenience which
are valid throughout the rest of the paper. Positive consumption effects are taken into
consideration as benefits and negative ones as costs, respectively. This holds, for example, for
environmental effects as well. It is possible to take long-term effects into consideration without
any uncertainties; they are valued fully and correctly as well. Uncertainty aspects will not be
investigated. However, this should be done when determining and valuing consumption effects
and not by discounting.
3.1 Pure Time Preference Rate
The most common theoretical assumption is that an individual values the utility of goods the
less, the further the consumption takes place in the future. Prospective needs are valued less
highly solely because they occur in the future (pure time preference rate ρ). This phenomenon
occurs because of individual "myopia", impatience and other influences (see among others
Pigou (1912), Harrod (1948), etc.). Some authors utilize this rate not only because of myopia
and impatience, but also due to the predicted remaining life expectancy of individuals (see e.g.
Pearce/Ulph (1995)).
The pure time preference rate is utilized in optimal growth theory as well as in (exhaustible and
renewable) resources models to ensure the convergence of the utility integral. Therefore, it has
to be modeled as an exponential utility discount rate. Each (representative) individual maxi-
mizes the sum of the weighted utilities of consumption according to the planning horizon
(infinity) with reference to the planning time 0 in Ramsey models. For instance, equation (1)
determines a consumption profile which is valid for all time periods 0,...,∞ of the planning hori-
zon, which is dependent on the level of the pure time preference rate.
If we transfer this assumption to different individuals, then the utility of a special good which is
available for future generations is worth less than the same good is worth for today's gen-
erations in utility units. Discounting utility now implies an ethical judgment about the position
of the generations (see e.g. Solow (1974)). Future generations are worth less, the later they are
born. This implicit setting of a norm is inconsistent with the neoclassical efficiency criteria.
These criteria guarantee that individuals are ranked equally, because no individual is allowed to
be disadvantaged; respectively the sum of the utilities of all individuals has to be maximized.
Looking at the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, this valuation is ethically justified in utilitarianism,
which is not interested in improving the welfare of special groups, but rather of all affected
persons. All human beings are ranked equally: "... utilitari[ani]sm attaches exactly the same
importance to the utilities of all people in the objective function, and that feature ... guarantees
that everyone's utility gets the same weight in the maximizing exercise." (Sen (1992), see
Broome (1992) as well). Since e.g. the consequences of global warming concern future gen-
erations as well, their interests have to be taken into account when investigating efficient global
warming policy.
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Valuation of future generations implies that economic theory gives up its neutrality regarding
distributional aspects. Economic theory favors today's generations and discriminates against fu-
ture ones because of distributional reasons. Judgments regarding long-term projects are dis-
torted. There is an innate bias against long-term projects where short-term costs appear and
where utilities are feasible mainly at the end of the planning horizon, for example, climate
change policy. Cost-benefit analysis mixes statements concerning efficiency and distributional
aspects (see e.g. Mohr (1995), Azar/Sterner (1996)). However, neoclassical models
concentrate principally on efficiency aspects. But when investigating long-term projects, it is
necessary to strictly separate distributional aspects from efficiency ones.
Ethical aspects cannot be used to legitimatize intergenerational discounting either. It is neither
possible to fall back upon the theory of utilitarianism nor upon the Rawlsian fairness theory in
order to justify intergenerational discounting. In the various contract-theoretical concepts fol-
lowing Rawls in environmental ethics - environment as a fundamental liberty (see Singer
(1988)) or as an economic good, where the difference principle could be applied as a fairness
norm (see Pearce (1988)) - the equal treatment of generations is stressed explicitly. Causes of
pure time preference are attributed to human impatience and myopia. These phenomena are
connected with weakness of will, weakness of imagination, defective telescopic faculty etc., all
of which cannot be ethically accepted as reasons for intergenerational discounting. Well-known
authors such as Hume, Ramsey, Pigou, Harrod, and Georgescu-Roegen reject pure time
discounting of future utilities because they regard it as irrational and immoral. Cline and
Broome argue in the same way in reference to global warming (see Cline (1992), Broome
(1992)). Broome further denies the empirical relevance of the pure preference for the present
and states that a positive interest rate can be explained by causes other than time preference
(Broome (1992)).
Nobody knows if a pure time preference rate really exists and if so, how high it might be. Some
authors deny the existence of a positive pure time preference rate (see e.g. Schumpeter (1952),
Hampicke (1992)). Various attempts to estimate the pure time preference rate have produced
different results and are not comparable with each other because they mix different influences,
e.g. individual versus societal rates, short-term versus long-term rates, utility- and
consumption-oriented rates, time preference rates of industrialized and developing countries
etc. (see for comprehensive overall views Pearce/Ulph (1995) and Price (1993)). In economic
models of climate protection, a standard rate of 3% is applied (see among others Nordhaus
(1994), Manne et al. (1995), Nordhaus/Yang (1996), Peck/Teisberg (1994), etc.).
Pearce/Ulph (1995) mention further studies in which the pure time preference rate tends to be
around 1.5%. Experimental behavior-theoretical studies partially result in negative pure time
preference rates (see among others Loewenstein/Prelec (1992), Loewenstein/Prelec (1991),
Kahneman et al. (1991), Thaler (1981)).
With the assumption of a positive pure time preference rate, Ramsey models contain a contra-
diction as well. If the equilibral development goes along with constant population and constant
Bayer/Cansier: Intergenerational Discounting: A new Approach 8
per capita income, then the marginal productivity of capital and the growth time preference
rate equal zero and a positive pure rate of time preference cannot exist. In Ramsey models,
only the growth time preference rate should be applied, even if this contradicts mathematical
necessities (convergence of the utility integral to a constant value).
In summary, no convincing reasons exist for discounting the utilities of human beings only be-
cause they are living in the future. The ethical basis, the methodology of neoclassical models
and the inherent rationality assumptions forbid the application of an individual pure time
preference rate where future generations are concerned.
3.2 Growth Discounting
An individual growth discount rate can be determined when we make special assumptions
about the utility function and the growth of consumption. We want to work with a CRRA-
utility function (constant relative risk aversion) which is characterized by:
(5) [ ]U C Ct t=
−
−1
1
ε
ε
 .
The discount factor is given by (1+g)ε⋅t for constant consumption (real) growth rates g. The
term ε⋅g is a good approximation for this expression for plausibly small values of g. This shows
the equivalence to one component of the Ramsey rule (see equation (2)). Taking the
logarithmic utility function as a special case where ε = 1, the discount rate is equal to the
growth rate of per capita consumption.
Growth discounting can be utilized in intergenerational comparisons as well. However, two as-
sumptions have to be fulfilled: diminishing marginal utility with respect to consumption when
consumption increases, and long-term growth. If there is negative growth, we have to discount
negatively. Even authors who are critical of intergenerational discounting acknowledge this
argument (see e.g. Cline (1992)). Discounting now means that a future individual values an
extra unit of consumption with a lower marginal utility than a present one only because the
future individual is wealthier. The utility function is the same for both of them. If we accept
this idea, then the growth discounting method is only a necessary condition for maximizing
utilities intertemporally in the neoclassical model. The same levels of utility are given the same
weights, thus, no differences exist between generations. The requirement for justice of utilitari-
anism is actually fulfilled, but only in this case. If one did without discounting in this situation,
one would rank future generations higher than today's generation if there is a positive growth
rate in the economy. Global warming policy appears to be too beneficial. However, if we carry
out cost-benefit analyses in utility units, consumption discounting is impermissible because all
effects of diminishing marginal utility are taken into account in the utility function itself (see
table 1).
We should keep in mind that individual welfare is influenced by both consumption and environ-
mental resources. Despite positive per capita consumption growth rates, it is possible that fu-
ture individuals' welfare is not significantly higher than the present's because the environmental
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conditions have deteriorated. The increase in individual welfare is possibly quite modest or
even negative. The development of the growth rate in the very long-term is most uncertain.
Neoclassical growth theorists stress unlimited technological progress which guarantees a
positive long-term growth rate of per capita consumption. On the other hand, ecological
economists are critical of future development because of limits of natural resources and the
possible endangering of the natural existential basis.
Even reasonable predictions of the growth rate cannot conceal that methodological problems
with respect to how to determine utility and how to specify the utility function still exist. The
total welfare of an individual is not measurable in cardinal units. This is the most important
critical point of view concerning the scientific utilization of the growth discount rate and,
therefore, against the usage of neoclassical OLG-models according to section 2. Even attempts
to estimate the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption cannot deny the fact that utility is
not objectively ascertainable in reality. All of the statements are speculative. It is unknown if
and how rapidly utility does increase with rising consumption. Knowing that marginal utility is
decreasing is insufficient. It is also impossible for politicians to have information about the
utility functions of the citizens and, therefore, they are unable to control the assumptions of the
cost-benefit calculation. This implies that it is useless to repeat the computations with alterna-
tively higher or lower rates. Nobody knows which assumptions are meaningful. If there are no
clues about the rate of decrease of the marginal utility, then there is hardly another possibility
for researchers other than to ignore the phenomenon of diminishing marginal utility as a source
of legitimization for discounting.
The growth discount rate is of special relevance when individuals in different countries with,
more importantly, different welfare levels are concerned by a project. The not yet fully devel-
oped countries strive for high growth in order to catch up vis a vis the industrialized countries.
Therefore, one can assume a higher growth time preference rate for those countries. In
industrialized countries, the growth time preference rate will be lower due to the already
realized higher level of individual and societal welfare.
In summary, neglecting methodological problems of cardinal utility measurement, a positive
time discount rate can be founded on a positive GDP/GNP growth rate and consumption
growth rate, respectively. Inevitably, this makes it an approximative and subjective procedure.
However, the growth rate of GDP/GNP (consumption), can be utilized as a suitable indicator
for the growth of individual and societal welfare. If the cost-benefit comparison is undertaken
in utility units, the application of the growth time preference rate in discounting is not allowed
because the utility units take the decreasing marginal utility directly into account.
4. The Treatment of Opportunity Costs
Equation (2) shows that in a first-best world where no distortions of market allocation caused
by, for example, government interventions and/or uncorrected market failures, the distinction
between the rate of opportunity costs and the rate of time preference is unnecessary. Both
rates correspond to each other and equal the exogenous market interest rate i (see above). This
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assumption is extremely impractical. In the real world, one can see that time preference rate
and the opportunity cost rate differ. It has to be assumed that the opportunity cost rate exceeds
the rate of time preference. In this case, which rate will be used in the intergenerational context
is decisive. One has to take into consideration, though, that the two underlying variables, con-
sumption and investment, are not comparable.
Implementation of a public project requires the usage of scarce resources which have to be
taken from other usages. Other consumption goods are forgone directly or indirectly - via the
omission of investments. These lost returns represent the opportunity costs of the public pro-
ject. For discounting it is essential to what extent this displacement directly affects con-
sumption or investment. In the simplest case, we assume that only consumption is displaced.
The usual formula for the net present value of a public investment then only contains con-
sumption units, which are to be discounted using the social rate of time preference:
(6) PV = − + −
+
+
−
+
+ +
−
+
C C C C C C Cn n
n0
1 1 2 2
21 1 1
*
* * *
( ) ... ( )δ δ δ  ,
where the variables are defined as follows: Ct = consumption effects of the public investment,
Ct* = lost consumption of other goods, δ = social rate of time preference.
In the realistic case of large long-term public projects, other private investments are displaced
as well. These investments would have allowed the provision of consumption goods in future
periods, in accordance with their internal rate of return r. Application of the Harberger Rule
demands that total lost consumption and investment, respectively, have to be discounted using
a weighted rate composed of the marginal time preference rate and the rate of return of the dis-
placed investments. Let us have a look at an example: due to investment and current expendi-
tures of a public project, 20 % of other private investments (It*) are displaced and 80 % of
consumption (Ct*), respectively. We obtain the following formula of net present value,
applying the discount rate h = 0,8 ⋅ δ + 0,2 ⋅ r:
(7) PV = − − + − −
+
+ +
− −
+
I C C I C
h
C I C
h
n n n
n0 0
1 1 1
1 1
* *
* * * *
... ( )  .
This method is logically inconsistent because unequal units are added and subtracted. Dis-
placed investments and displaced consumption are not equivalent. Usually, investment units are
of higher value than consumption ones (in second-best economies). Therefore all variables
have to be expressed in consumption units in the net-present-value formula.
It is possible to estimate intertemporal negative consumption effects directly, but quite compli-
cated. Instead we can apply simplifying methods which are suggested in the literature to obtain
some shadow prices of capital. Cline (1992) uses a method which represents the annuity of a
displaced investment as continuously lost consumption (annuity method): we have to deter-
mine the actually displaced investments in a particular time period. Next we have to calculate
the annuity within the expected lifetime by using the estimated rates of return of the displaced
investments. For computing present values at the time where investments have been replaced,
we have to use the social time preference rate. The outcome is called the "consumption
equivalent". If we apply the consumption equivalent to one unit of investment, then the
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shadow price of capital, vc, results. It expresses how much one unit of capital is worth in con-
sumption units. The shadow price of capital of an investment which is characterized by the rate
of return r and the lifetime n is given by the annuity a, calculated with the rate of return r,
multiplied with the inverse of the annuity b, computed on basis of the social time preference
rate δ:
(8) vc = a . b    where   
( )
a
r r
r
b
n
n
n
n
=
+
+ −
=
+ −
+
( )
( ) ( )
1
1 1
1 1
1
   and   
δ
δ δ
.
If r corresponds to δ, the shadow price of capital equals one. This is the constellation in neo-
classical first-best analysis. Investment and consumption units are valued equally. This means
that the displaced amount of investment is equal to the loss of consumption units. The shadow
price of capital vc is greater than one whenever the rate of return r exceeds the social rate of
time preference δ and when we argue in second-best economies, respectively. Cline uses the
following data in his climate model: timespan of the investments n=15 years, internal rate of
return r=8%, and the social rate of time preference (actually the growth discount rate g)
δ=1.5% (δ=2%). A shadow price of capital of 1.56 (1.50) results.
The main idea of this method is that recovered capital and returns should be continuously con-
sumed according to the annuity. This is contradictory if the rate of return r has been calculated
as the internal rate of return, which implies that capital returns have to be permanently rein-
vested throughout the whole lifetime. However, it is suitable if we use a method for calculating
the internal rate of return which takes into account that the investor maintains at least the initial
capital stock but wants to consume parts of the real returns of the investment. Generally, this
rate is smaller than the original one, but it is more operational.
This contradiction can also be avoided if we assume that neither the complete initial capital
stock nor the returns during the lifetime of the investment can be consumed. The initial capital
accumulates according to the calculation of compound interest. It is only possible to increase
consumption at the end of the investment period (end of horizon-method). The internal rate
of return of any investment - displaced at the planning period zero and providing additional
consumption units throughout the whole timespan of n years - can be calculated according to:
(9) ( ) ( ) ( )I r C r C r Cn n n n0 1 1 2 21 1 1+ = + + + + +− − ...  .
Discounting to the planning time using the social rate of time preference and applying the
shadow price of capital veoh to one investment unit results in:
(10) veoh = ( )( )
1
1
+
+
r
n
nδ
.
veoh exceeds vc for all r>δ and for a marginal propensity to save with respect to returns of in-
vestment smaller than unity. If we employ Cline's data, the shadow price of capital, veoh, is 2.54
(δ=1,5%) and 2.36 (δ=2%), respectively. The problem with using this method is that the inves-
tor cannot consume during the lifetime of the investment. It is only possible for him to
consume all accumulated capital at the end of the planning horizon. This is not very realistic,
especially if we investigate long-term investments.
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In contradiction to those models, Bradford (1975) uses a method where the marginal rate of
consumption is applied to total accumulated capital. Reductions of the initial capital stock are,
therefore, possible. Another way for determining a shadow price of capital has been derived by
Lind (1982) and Zerbe/Dively (1994), respectively. In their model, it is only possible to
consume the returns of investments. A positive marginal propensity to save with respect to
investment returns implies an increasing capital stock throughout the planning horizon.
Bradford investigates the effects of a one-period investment on the consumption and invest-
ment profiles in any of the following (n) periods within the planning horizon, which has been
determined exogenously. The rate of return r and the marginal propensity to save with respect
to the accumulated initial capital stock (wealth) s are constant throughout the planning
horizon. We standardize our investment to unity. The investment in period 0 yields a wealth
(W) in period 1 of W(1)=(1+r). This results in a consumption level in period 1 of c(1)=(1+r)⋅(1
−s). The individual saves the amount s(1)=s⋅(1+r). In period 2, the initial capital stock
increases to W(2)=s⋅(1+r)2. W(2) is split up into consumption c(2)=(1−s)⋅s⋅(1+r)2 and saving
s(2)=s2⋅(1+r)2. Reinvestment of s(2) produces a wealth in period 3 of W(3)=s2⋅(1+r)3 which
can be used for consumption c(3)=(1−s)⋅s2⋅(1+r)3 or for reinvestment s(3)=s3⋅(1+r)3. This
process continues throughout the whole planning horizon. If we want to determine the shadow
price of capital, we have to discount all consumption amounts of each period to the planning
time by using the social rate of time preference. This yields:
(11) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )v s
r
s
r
s
r
B
j
n
j
= − ⋅
+
+
⋅ ⋅
+
+



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       where     1 1
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1
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1
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δ δ δ
has to be valid so that vB converges. In our specification, as in most realistic cases, the expres-
sion in equation (11) converges swiftly against a constant value. The Bradford criterion
becomes more realistic when we give up the restrictive assumptions about the constancy of r
and s for each period within the planning horizon. This is shown in the original paper of
Bradford (1975) or in the comments by Lind (1982) and Cline (1992).
Lind (1982) allows only consumption to such an extent that the initial capital stock is (at least)
held constant over the whole planning horizon. Reinvestment has to be undertaken to maintain
the initial capital stock. The maximum possible consumption per period is given by the internal
rate of return multiplied with the initial capital stock. We want to consider a one-period invest-
ment as well, and the initial capital stock is standardized to unity (adaptation of Lind's method
by Zerbe/Dively (1994)). Furthermore, we presume constant r and s. In period 1, the capital
stock has increased to W(1) = (1+r). The investor is only allowed to split up his income r, the
return on investment, into consumption and reinvestment. Additional consumption of r⋅(1−s) is
available in period 1. The amount r⋅s will be reinvested and increases the initial capital stock in
period 1. Wealth in period 2 is then given by W(2) = (1+r)⋅(1+sr). Only the return of the capi-
tal stock of period 1, r⋅(1+sr), can be consumed or reinvested in period 2. The investor is able
to consume an amount of C(2) = (1−s)⋅r⋅(1+sr). Reinvestment in period 2 is given by S(2) = s⋅r
⋅(1+sr). This procedure continues for all following periods throughout the planning horizon.
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The capital stock grows continuously according to the rate r⋅s (for all s>0). Equation (12)
provides an overall view of the development of consumption C and wealth W per period:
(12)
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In order to determine the shadow price of capital, we have to discount all consumption units
throughout the planning horizon back to the planning period. The relevant discount rate is the
social rate of time preference. The shadow price of capital is given by:
(13) ( ) ( )( )v s r
sr
L
j
jj
n
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+
+
∑
−
=
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1 δ
.
The sum in equation (13) is a geometrical series and converges to a constant value, just like the
Bradford-criterion, if s<δ/r.
The methods of Bradford and Lind and Zerbe/Dively, respectively, cannot be compared di-
rectly. The reason is that the marginal propensities to save have different points of reference.
Lind requires that the capital stock should at least be constant over time, whereas Bradford ex-
plicitly allows the initial capital stock to decrease. If the reinvestment quota in the Bradford
model is for example 30%, then the capital stock (wealth of the human being) declines rapidly.
However, a positive marginal rate of saving in the Lind approach signifies an increasing capital
stock throughout the whole planning horizon.
The "reinvestment methods" by Bradford, Lind and Zerbe/Dively assume that an investment
induces subsequent investments according to a determined mechanism (in compliance with a
fixed marginal propensity to save) throughout the whole planning horizon. If we investigate
single investments on the other hand, we are reducing potential investment series to pieces.
Each displacement of an investment has to be valued by determining its own shadow price of
capital. This method is more flexible. It takes into account all kinds of investment effects.
Therefore, opportunity costs calculated on this basis are more accurate.
Systematic differences in the level of the rates of return of investments which are displaced can
exist between not yet fully developed countries and industrialized countries. In developing
countries, the rates of return of certain investments (education, public health, transport, public
administration, etc.) are above average. This is caused by the presence of technological defi-
ciencies in comparison to industrialized countries. In developing countries, for example, the
same expenditures in climate protection as in industrialized countries would enter a cost-
benefit calculation of global climate protection with considerably higher opportunity costs.
Together with the relatively high rate of time preference, this would lead to a more reserved
valuation of climate protection policy in these countries.
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In summary, the cost-benefit analysis would be incomplete and the result would be distorted
if the displaced returns of omitted investments were not considered. The profitability of public
projects would be overestimated. The expansion of governmental activity would greatly exceed
the efficient level. A lot of public investments would be carried out which possess lesser social
rates of return than private investments. Virtually all entrepreneurial activity would be sup-
pressed. In the case of long-term public projects such as climate protection, this distortion
would not only be disadvantageous for today’s generations but for future generations as well
because the exaggerated goal of climate protection would face an insufficient capital accumula-
tion (supply with material consumption goods). These objections do not hold any longer if
cost-benefit analyses list the project costs in total - even if necessarily simplified - using the
shadow price of capital methods.
5. Adjusted OLG-Discounting Model with respect to intergenerational com-
parisons
Beginning with neoclassical theory, we want to derive a methodology for discounting intergen-
erationally in a more correct way than the conventional theory does. This will be done in the
framework of an OLG-model, taking into account all critical remarks of the previous chapters.
Because we use shadow prices of capital to determine opportunity costs, we are able to fully
concentrate on time preference rates as discount rates. The necessity of having
intergenerational effects in mind when determining present values in the framework of cost-
benefit analysis has been outlined by Kula (1992), Kula (1997) and Burton (1993). A more
detailed analysis of the following discounting method can be found in Bayer/Cansier (1998).
First of all, some simplifying methodological assumptions are required. We want to concen-
trate our analysis on the consumer side. Production effects and the production process itself
shall not be investigated primarily. We demonstrate our method within a partial framework, but
we do not leave opportunity costs unconsidered. Therefore, once again, we concentrate our
analysis on consumption effects.
Now the technical assumptions. We demonstrate our discounting method in the framework of
global warming. The number of generations living simultaneously is three. Each generation
lives for three periods. The births and deaths of all generations are defined as follows: The
oldest generation A lives one more period and dies at the end of period t0. Generation D is
born at the beginning of period t1. We want to assume for convenience that these two points in
time are identical. The procedure continues: generation B lives two further periods at the
beginning of the planning horizon and dies at the end of period t1 (beginning of t2), generation
C lives for three more periods and dies at the end of period t2. Global warming policy causes
consumption changes in all periods. These effects - consumption increases as well as decreases
- are supposed to equally concern all living generations. The valuation of consumption effects
is the same throughout the total planning horizon. This means that the preferences of all living
generations are constant. The age structure of the population is assumed to be constant
throughout the whole planning horizon as well. Greenhouse policy is started in period t0 (see
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table 2 for further details). The total consumption per period of all living generations is repre-
sented as the column sum. The consumption discount factor reaches a constant value after a
few periods (in this case as of period t2, but in general from that period, where we subtract one
from the maximum lifetime).
Generation t0 t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 L tn Sum
A c0 c0
B c0 c1⋅θ-1 c0 + c1⋅θ-1
C c0 c1⋅θ-1 c2⋅θ-2 c0 + c1⋅θ-1 + c2⋅θ-2
D c1 c2⋅θ-1 c3⋅θ-2 c1 + c2⋅θ-1 + c3⋅θ-2
E c2 c3⋅θ-1 c4⋅θ-2 c2 + c3⋅θ-1 + c4⋅θ-2
F c3 c4⋅θ-1 c5⋅θ-2 L L c3 + c4⋅θ-1 + c5⋅θ-2
G c4 c5⋅θ-1 L L c4 + c5⋅θ-1 + c6⋅θ-2
H c5 L L c5 + c6⋅θ-1 + c7⋅θ-2
M M O L M
Sum 3⋅c0 c1⋅(1+
2⋅θ-1)
c2⋅
(1+θ-1
+θ-2)
c3⋅
(1+θ-1
+θ-2)
c4⋅
(1+θ-1
+θ-2)
c5⋅
(1+θ-1
+θ-2)
L L Σ
Table 2: Benefit and cost effects in a three generation model, θ = (1+δ)
We argue as follows in order to calculate a present value in the planning period t0: each gen-
eration discounts the consumption effects which were induced by an investment in planning
period t0 to the start of its life. Generation F, for example, discounts its lifetime consumption to
period t3. In order to calculate a present value at planning time t0, we have to discount the de-
termined value once again to t0. In this context, we have to take into consideration that the dis-
count factor for fixing the present value at time t0 can only be comprised of the growth
discount rate. Within the generations, the value of the discount rate equals δ, the sum of the
pure time preference rate and the growth discount rate ("intragenerational discounting"). In
order to relate lifetime consumption to the planning period of the climate policy, we discount
intergenerationally and thus cannot use the pure time preference rate.
It is important to remember how to handle consumption growth in our discounting model: If
there is a positive (consumption) growth rate, we have to discount intergenerationally with a
positive growth discount rate. If there is no consumption growth in the economies (g=0), then
we cannot discount with a growth discount rate. This implies that all generation-specific
present values at the beginning of the lives of each generation have to be taken into account
with their values at this time period in order to determine present values in the planning time
period t0. Of course, if there is negative growth in some economies, we have to discount
negatively. Future effects have to be valued more highly in today's units because of diminishing
consumption possibilities.
The model becomes more realistic if we increase the number of generations to about 40. This
will sufficiently express the maximum remaining lifetime expectancy of the youngest adult gen-
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eration world-wide. The generations living in the periods 0 to 39 discount their investment-in-
duced consumption effects directly to the planning period t0. This is amended from generation
40 on. Consumption effects belonging to this generation are discounted to the beginning of
their lives (period t1). In order to correctly analyze benefits and costs, we have to discount the
present value at period t1 to the planning time t0 again by using the growth discount rate. The
further the generations live in the future, the bigger the distance is between the birth of any
future generation and the planning period t0 for the cost-benefit analysis. Thus, the discount
factor increases exponentially here as well, but with a smaller rate than in the Ramsey model.
The present value of all effects in the OLG-model is always bigger than in the Ramsey model.
The difference increases rapidly with increasing time distances.
We want to have a look at an example to explain the differences. We assume only one con-
sumption effect with an amount of 400 200 years from now. In the Ramsey model, the present
value (PVR) - discounted using a pure time preference rate ρ=3 % and a constant growth rate
of per capita consumption g=3 % (ε=1) - is given by:
(14) ( )PV
c
gR
=
+ +
=
200
2001 ρ
3.47⋅10-3.
In the OLG-model, the present value changes. The consumption amount of 400 in period t200 is
distributed equally amongst all 40 living generations in period t200. Each generation living in t200
receives an amount of 10 consumption units. Determining a present value in our concept is
more difficult than in the Ramsey model because of the correct treatment of generation-specific
consumption effects. The effects occurring in the periods exceeding the maximum life
expectancy are discounted by just using the growth discount rate. Effects within the individual
lifetimes can be discounted by using the growth discount rate as well as the pure time
preference rate. The present value of investment-induced consumption effects can be calcu-
lated according to equation (15):
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     where      for all    
PH symbolizes the planning horizon of the analyzed investment project and L represents the
life expectancy of each generation (in our example L=40). G is the number of generations
which live simultaneously. The variables j, i, and l are used as time indices. The first term of
the sum considers the intragenerational consumption effects which appear in the planning pe-
riod for all presently-living generations. In analogy to table 2, we want to assume that the cli-
mate protection policy cannot be anticipated by the individuals. Therefore, the living genera-
tions will value the project differently from those born after the planning period t0. It would be
easy, however, to assume perfect foresight in our calculation. Consumption effects affecting
the generations living in the planning period are then considered and intragenerationally dis-
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counted in accordance with their life expectancy. The fracture in the numerator of the second
term of the sum in equation (15) expresses the intergenerational consumption effects of the
generation born after the planning period t0. As these effects are discounted to the beginning of
the lives of the respective generation only, the intragenerational present value has to be related
to the planning period as well in order to evaluate the social profitability as perceived in the
planning period. This is done by discounting using the growth time preference rate in the
denominator of the fraction on the right-hand side of equation (15). We still have to consider
the fact that intragenerational effects which become relevant after the end of the planning
horizon cannot be taken into account in our calculation. Therefore consumption effects ci or cj
(where i, j > PH) are not taken into consideration.
Looking at our example, a PVOLG results as 0.6532. This is about 188 times larger than the
Ramsey one. If the consumption effect takes place in t300, then the OLG-present value is about
3.319 times larger than the Ramsey one (PVOLG=0.03399; PVR=1.024⋅10-5). The difference
diminishes if the consumption effect occurs in t100. The OLG present value is about 10.6 times
larger than the Ramsey one (PVOLG=12.554; PVR=1.179).
Looking at another example will help to illustrate our approach more clearly: we use a social
time preference rate δ of 5 %, but the components vary. In the first case, ρ is assumed to be 3
% and g equals 2 %. In the second case, the discount rates are the other way round: ρ=2 %
and g=3%. Of course, the Ramsey present value is the same in both cases: PVR100=3.042;
PVR200=0.0231; PVR300=1.759⋅10-4. Different components in the Ramsey rule do not change the
overall results. However, this is not true in our OLG-model: in the case where ρ=3 % and
g=2%, the following present values result: PVOLG100= 33.16; PVOLG200= 4.58; PVOLG300=0.63. In
the 100 year case, the OLG-value is about 10.9 times larger than the Ramsey one. The dif-
ferences become more distinct with increasing timespans: the present value is about 198 times
larger in the 200 year case and about 3,582 times larger in the 300 year case. This changes in
the second case, where ρ=2 % and g=3 %. The present values in the OLG-model are given by:
PVOLG100=14.66 ; PVOLG200=0.763 ; PVOLG300=0.0397. This implies that the differences between
the Ramsey and the OLG-present values become smaller: For the 100 year planning horizon, it
is about 4.8 times larger, about 33 times larger in the 200 year case, and about 226 times larger
in the 300 year case. This is due to the larger growth rate in the second case which is used for
intergenerational discounting. This example shows clearly that our approach is more accurate
than the Ramsey one. Although the Ramsey present value is the same in both cases, the
profitability of the project can vary. This has to be taken into account in intergenerational
decisions.
Opportunity costs can be included in this concept without difficulty. When using the shadow
price of capital methods of Bradford, Lind, Zerbe/Dively, and the end of horizon method, we
have to differentiate between discounting intra- or intergenerationally. For intragenerational
shadow prices of capital, we can take the growth and the pure time preference rate into ac-
count: δ=ρ+g. If the evaluation project provides consumption effects for future generations,
we are only allowed to use the growth discount rate for calculating present values: δ=g. Thus,
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we have to utilize different time preference rates with respect to discount intra- and intergen-
erational effects, respectively, when we determine shadow prices of capital as well. The
statements change slightly when we use Cline's annuity method. In order to discount, we have
to use the sum of the growth discount rate and the pure time preference rate δ=ρ+g. The rea-
son is that we have taken all consumption effects of all periods within the planning horizon into
account and distribute additional consumption units equally according to the total time
preference rate of the generation which plans the project, when we determine the annuity.
We want to have a special look at the differences of the analyzed discounting models. There-
fore, the main characteristics of our approach are compared to the neoclassical OLG-model in
section 2:
• We concentrate our analysis on project-induced consumption effects. This means that our
approach does not require the general equilibrium assumption. We are able to judge projects
as they are, without referring to lifetime consumption planning in the past. Therefore, the
assumption of perfect foresight is not necessary, which makes our approach more realistic.
• The adjusted OLG-model is strictly consumption-oriented, taking consumption as a suitable
indicator for (individual and societal) welfare. No cardinal utility measurement of
generation-specific utilities in one hundred, two-hundred or more years is necessary.
• Opportunity costs can be taken into account in a very convenient way by determining the
shadow prices of capital. The unsolvable problem in second-best economies - to determine
"the" correct discount rate (opportunity cost oriented or time-preference oriented) in neo-
classical models - is not relevant.
• Decision makers are able to take varying growth rates into account utilizing our approach.
The usage of a single discount rate can easily be avoided. This makes our discounting model
more powerful in empirical studies than the conventional neoclassical models.
• Our approach is more explicit with respect to discounting than the neoclassical one, where
the discounting process is a consequence of the assumed behavior of all affected genera-
tions. In particular market failures in the long-term can be analyzed in a more correct way
using our approach than with the neoclassical one. The whole discounting process itself is
more transparent for intertemporal decision makers with our approach than with the implicit
adaptation mechanism in neoclassical models.
In summary, the OLG-discounting method fits best in neoclassical cost-benefit analysis. Inter-
generational distributional aspects are taken into consideration, as well as the complete inclu-
sion of all relevant intragenerational utility effects. It is not necessary to perfectly apply this
method in reality. Our simple model using the assumption of a finite lifetime of equally con-
cerned generations provides much better results than the Ramsey model and is sufficient for
empirical cost-benefit analyses.
We implicitly demand the usage of variable (growth) discount rates when we use our OLG-
model. The traditional method of utilizing a constant discount rate can only be maintained if
there is constant (real) growth in all investigated economies throughout the planning horizon.
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This seems to be very unrealistic and, therefore, we want to relax this assumption. In our
model, we have to take predicted (real) growth rates for all economies into account. Thus, the
analyses using our discounting model get much better results than traditional cost-benefit
analyses using a constant discount rate in intergenerational comparisons.
6. Political Summary
The failure to comply with the intergenerational aspect in discounting leads to an underestima-
tion of long-term projects and political programs in cost-benefit analysis. Different project
types are affected to differing extents by this discrimination. In infrastructure projects such as
the construction of new railroad lines or highways, the main costs are incurred in the present,
but the benefits are realizable in the short run as well. In the medium run, the benefits already
outweigh the costs, so that generations living in the present still do benefit, and not only those
born in the future. A substantial part of the effects of the projects is valued correctly. The
underestimation of these long-term projects and thus the distortion of the decision as compared
to short-term public projects is rather moderate in this case. This is different in the case of very
long-term projects in which beneficiaries and cost bearers diverge. This holds true, for
instance, for decisions about global climate protection, the protection of the ozone layer, and
the conservation of biodiversity. Even small variations of the discount rate can result in
negative net present values in this case. Actions designed to reduce greenhouse emissions, for
example, will only contribute to an improvement of climate in 50 or more years. The costs
enter today’s planning decision with full weight, while the benefits of the far future are taken
into account only to a very decimated extent.
We want to have a closer look at the model calculations done by Nordhaus (1994) - the
DICE-model (Dynamic Integrated model of Climate and the Economy). With respect to
discounting, Nordhaus assumed that there is an infinitely-lived agent with a constant pure time
preference rate of 3 %. The overall discount rate diminishes from 6.5 % at the starting point to
about 4.5 % in the year 2105. The difference between the two rates is characterized as the
growth discount rate. Simulations with the original coding show that the optimal (efficient)
climate protection policy leads to a reduction of the global average temperature by 0.2° C by
the end of the next century as compared to the business-as-usual (bau) emission path without
climate-protection measures (increase in the optimal case: 3.1° C, in the bau-case: 3.3° C).
However, these are temperature increases for which natural scientists fear irreversible
interference with the entire ecosystem all over the world (see e.g. Houghton (1994)). Our own
sensitivity calculations with different discount rates show, on the other hand, that the variation
of discount rates results in drastic changes in the optimal emission rate: in the year 1995, the
optimal rate of reduction of greenhouse gases is 8.8% (related to the base year 1965 in the
model) in the original model. If one relinquishes utility discounting, this rate increases to
38.3%. Also, by using a utility discount rate of one percent (two percent) p.a., a higher optimal
emission reduction rate than in the original coding of 19.6% (12.5%) results. At higher rates,
fewer emissions are reduced - 5.1% (ρ=5%); 2.7 % (ρ=8 %); and 1.9 % (ρ=10 %). This shows
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that the choice of the discount rate can, ceteris paribus, lead to the result that drastic
greenhouse gas mitigation as well as the (almost total) renunciation of this may be efficient.
The same holds for projects with high future costs, however, with the opposite sign. Nuclear
power plant projects can serve as an example. The relatively current benefits face high future
costs resulting from the shutdown of production plants and the risks of the final deposition of
nuclear waste.
In decisions regarding the usage of natural resources, the level of the discount rate plays an
important role as well (see e.g. Cansier/Bayer (1998)). For exhaustible resources, according to
the Hotelling rule, an optimal exploitation path results if the growth rate of the price path of
the resource equals the pure time preference rate. We want to demonstrate the considerations
of a representative household. It wants to maximize the utility of a given stock (S) of the
resource intertemporally by consuming the quantity Rt in time period t. The usual assumption
of diminishing marginal utility holds for the utility function. Resource exploitation diminishes
the given stock which is taken into consideration as a condition for utility maximization in
equation (16). &S  symbolizes the first time derivative of the resource stock. The maximization
problem is given by:
(16) ( )( )max U C R e dtt t−∫ ρ     s.t.   &S R= - .
The higher the discount rate is, the quicker the resource is exploited. Resource users wish to
use the resource early in their lifetime. This leads the resource exploiters to begin immediate
exploitation because of rising prices. Interests of future generations are neglected if the re-
source exploitation is so fast that the stock is already exhausted when they are born. If this is
due to an excessively high pure time preference rate, this implies an intergenerational inefficient
resource use path. The process moves more slowly, if the pure time preference rate is lowered.
Households do not demand such high quantities of resources in the present as in the first case.
This means that the resource stock can be utilized longer than in cases with higher pure time
preference rates. The consideration of the intergenerational aspect would lead to a slower
exploitation of the resource, which means a time advantage in research and development of
substitutes.
In decisions regarding how to utilize renewable resources discounting with the pure time pref-
erence rate leads to higher current withdrawal quantities as well. The intertemporal utility
maximizing problem is as follows:
(17) ( )( )max U C R e dtt t−∫ ρ     s.t.   &S g S R= ( ) - .
In comparison to the exhaustible resources approach where no growth of the resource during
the planning period is assumed, the maximization problem changes. According to g(S), there is
natural growth of the renewable resource. For example, the resource stock is constant if the
exploitation in period t equals the newly grown quantity: g(S) = R. By the way, this
maximization problem is the same one as the Ramsey model of optimal capital accumulation
given in equation (1), where capital is interpreted as a renewable resource. In addition to the
pure time preference rate, a growth discount rate exists which can be the reason for a positive
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discount rate in intertemporal utility maximization even if the pure time preference rate is set to
zero.
Following the neoclassical model of optimal usage of stocks, higher withdrawal quantities will
be shown as efficient, the higher the discount rate is, and the extinction of stocks of renewable
as well as exhaustible resources will be reached even earlier. The supply position of genera-
tions in the far future is not regarded. Intergenerational discounting, on the other hand, recom-
mends that renewable resource stocks are preserved and can be used for a long(er) time.
Another important political aspect concerns the different methods of discounting in industrial-
ized and developing countries. Because of the lesser welfare situation in developing coun-
tries, their growth time preference rate is generally higher than in industrialized countries. The
renunciation of consumption today weighs heavier than in industrialized countries. In addition,
the return of investments is usually essentially higher due to the technical pent-up demand, so
that one has to calculate with higher opportunity costs, especially in environmental protection
measures. The different positions face one another in decisions about global environmental
projects such as climate protection. This poses the question in which way projects should be
discounted. Proceeding on the assumption of the conditions in industrialized countries, this
conflicts with the interests of the developing countries because climate protection is evaluated
too positively for them. This is just the reverse when the valuation is done according to the
conditions prevailing in developing countries. For industrialized countries, climate protection
would be considered to be too expensive. The contrasts will be mitigated if one proceeds from
weighted growth rates (and if emerging opportunity costs are taken into account in the
valuation of the projects with the help of shadow prices). However, a two step approach seems
to be the most suitable one: starting point is the single economies or economic regions. The
regional costs and benefits are discounted using the specific discount rates of the regions. This
results in a project-specific present value for every region, taking into consideration the actual
consumption increases and decreases, respectively, connected with the project and the
adequate discount rate. In a second step, these present values are aggregated. Here, for
instance, political necessities can be taken into account. If a positive global present value
results, the project is efficient under cost-benefit considerations.
Since the member countries of the United Nations, during the Conference on Environment and
Development held in Rio de Janeiro (1992), categorized their economic and environmental
policies under the leading idea of sustainable development, it is also of interest in which way
the discounting problem is related to the strategies of sustainable development. In economics,
the neoclassical concept of weak sustainability (of a constant total capital stock) and the
ecological-economic concept of strong sustainability (of a constant natural capital stock) are
conflicting (see e.g. Pearce et al. (1989), Pearce/Turner (1990)). A development is regarded
as sustainable in the neoclassical concept if per capita welfare remains constant over time.
Man-made goods and nature are substitutes. Long-term interventions in nature (exploitation of
exhaustible resources, exploitation of renewable resources exceeding the natural rate of
regeneration, global deterioration of the environment which exceeds the natural assimilation
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capacity, etc.) are always justified when the utility reduction incident is compensated for by a
corresponding excess supply with man-made goods. Renunciation of climate protection would
be sustainable in this sense, for instance, if the returns of CO2-emissions not only contribute to
an increase in actual consumption, but also enable investments which supply future generations
with additional man-made consumption goods, thus compensating for the disadvantages due to
climate damages. Further conditions under which constant utility is possible are described by
the Hartwick rule (see Hartwick (1977)). The ecological economists call for the preservation
of the vital functions of nature. These could not be substituted by artificial goods.
Both concepts exclude cost-benefit analyses and thus discounting. In the case of interference
with the environment, a compensation in form of man-made investment is called for, or a deg-
radation of the stock of environmental quality is not allowed. There is no room for economic
considerations. Both concepts are not realistic. Nature is neither completely substitutable by
man-made goods, nor are these substitution possibilities totally lacking. Besides it is not
understandable why the supply of mankind in the far future should always be at least constant
(or better) as compared to today's supply. In light of this, an intermediate conception of sus-
tainability can be formulated: in the long run, certain economic as well as ecological minimum
standards should be met. Such critical values should be determined for the degree of pollution
of environmental media (health standards for human beings, animals, and plants), for the stocks
of renewable resources (animal and plant stocks, survival conditions for populations and
feeding standards for mankind) and for the usage of exhaustible resources. This concept offers
the possibility of free decisions between provision with man-made goods and the usage of the
environment. Each generation can put more weight on economic growth or environmental
quality according to its preferences. The only condition is that the decisions of today’s
generation do not hurt the ecological and economic minimum standards of future generations.
Beyond the minimum standards, optimizing decisions can be made according to cost-benefit
analysis. Sustainable and intergenerational discounting do not necessarily exclude each other.
The closing remarks make clear how important the correct choice of the discount rate is in the
intergenerational context. In empirical cost-benefit analyses, therefore, the reasons for this
choice always have to be provided, namely whether it is oriented on the opportunity costs or
on the time preference of the population. The respective rates have to be carefully investigated
before being introduced in the impending cost-benefit analysis. Only this procedure guarantees
realistic findings. The usage of an unreflected (constant) discount rate represents reality
insufficiently. Sensitivity calculations with bigger or smaller discount rates cannot overcome
this shortcoming either: the cardinal problem, namely the choice of the correct discount rate(s)
for the project to be realized, cannot be solved by doing so. If the level of the discount rate is
contestable, it is impossible to judge whether a measure is (in-)efficient. The fixing of a dis-
count rate simply to make calculations feasible has to be rejected due to the same reasons,
especially if intergenerational effects are to be evaluated.
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